There is widespread sympathy for the ultras’ cause but none for their methodology
Dr Trinath Mishra
Author of ‘Barrel of the Gun’ – a study of Maoist movements
The Maoists have been waging a relentless armed campaign against the Indian State for the past 42 years. The movement that originated in Naxalbari (West Bengal) aims to bring down the parliamentary form of government and replace it with a proletarian regime. Launched initially to press for land reforms it has, down the years, morphed into a virulent guerrilla campaign. Within just a few years after Naxalism erupted in 1967, it had engulfed large swathes of rural West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. But now urban areas – metros like Kolkata and Hyderabad – too are threatened.
It was their disgust with rampant political horse trading and spiraling unemployment that drove these young people to take up arms against the State and their capitalist exploiters. In Naxalism’s early years, a large number of university students, even from professional institutions like engineering and medical colleges, gave up their studies and flocked to the cause. Large areas in these states came under their dominance and for a while it almost appeared that revolution was at the doorstep.
But the campaign was poorly organised and inexpertly led. A large number of criminal lumpen elements jumped on to its bandwagon to legitimise their activities. Moreover the leaders could never agree on which operational method was the most sound. Such disagreements caused several splinter groups to arise, spawning the culture of the personality cult. The State meanwhile got stronger. Political stability at the Centre and in the states enabled governments to launch Operation Steeple Chase and re-establish its authority in the vulnerable areas, and the mindless bloodletting sanctioned by the ultras turned public opinion against them.
Taking full advantage of the political instability of the 80’s and 90’s, the Naxalities re-established themselves in their old areas and used these bases to spread their tentacles in other regions. Under the banner of CPI (Maoist) they succeeded in uniting the various sub groups. The emergence of Maoists as the dominant political force in Nepal gave further boost to their morale.
Amidst all this the government response remained disoriented and disjointed. Naxalism was routinely treated as a ‘law and order’ problem to be tackled by the affected states. This was a mistake, because the police forces were too ill equipped to tackle the situation.
By the end of the last century the Maoists had expanded their influence politically, socially, territorially and economically – and by 2005 they had made their presence felt in 11 states. They remain well entrenched in large parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar.
The reasons behind the birth and growth of Maoist armed movements are well known, but both Central and state governments looked on passively. A competent anti-Maoist counter would have been to speedily and effectively strengthen Panchayati Raj institutions. This would have empowered the people and isolated the Maoists.
Armed revolutions against the modern state, especially those which have popular sanction, generally fail. To succeed, the revolution would require support from an outside power: direct or proxy invasion by a strong power or a civil war or a coup d’etat. But none of the three appears to be feasible in India. The Maoists, no matter how committed, are no match for the might of the government forces. Indeed they would do well to keep the fate of the LTTE in mind and quickly reform.
But this is not to say that the Maoist movement has not been without some notable achievements. In its own way it has empowered the poorest sections of our population. It has brought women in the forefront of the struggle. It has given voice to the dumb, so that even the sparrow has been turned into a hawk. So now no one can afford to neglect these communities and the areas they live in.
Development by all accounts is the key to solving this problem. The governments have an ambitious blueprint to develop these areas and have set apart a big budget for the purpose. However, since top-ranking Maoist leaders like Ganapati and Kishenji have summarily rejected the offer of negotiations, the sole alternative is to supplement developmental initiatives with an effective and coordinated armed response. As for the Maoist leaders, they urgently need to rethink and amend their strategies. This ‘Red Corridor’ or the ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone – stretching from Tirupati to Pashupati – can’t just be wished away. Yet while there is widespread sympathy and support for their cause, there is none for their methodology.
For Complete IIPM Article, Click on IIPM Article
Source : IIPM Editorial, 2009
Dr Trinath Mishra
Author of ‘Barrel of the Gun’ – a study of Maoist movements
The Maoists have been waging a relentless armed campaign against the Indian State for the past 42 years. The movement that originated in Naxalbari (West Bengal) aims to bring down the parliamentary form of government and replace it with a proletarian regime. Launched initially to press for land reforms it has, down the years, morphed into a virulent guerrilla campaign. Within just a few years after Naxalism erupted in 1967, it had engulfed large swathes of rural West Bengal, Andhra Pradesh and Bihar. But now urban areas – metros like Kolkata and Hyderabad – too are threatened.
It was their disgust with rampant political horse trading and spiraling unemployment that drove these young people to take up arms against the State and their capitalist exploiters. In Naxalism’s early years, a large number of university students, even from professional institutions like engineering and medical colleges, gave up their studies and flocked to the cause. Large areas in these states came under their dominance and for a while it almost appeared that revolution was at the doorstep.
But the campaign was poorly organised and inexpertly led. A large number of criminal lumpen elements jumped on to its bandwagon to legitimise their activities. Moreover the leaders could never agree on which operational method was the most sound. Such disagreements caused several splinter groups to arise, spawning the culture of the personality cult. The State meanwhile got stronger. Political stability at the Centre and in the states enabled governments to launch Operation Steeple Chase and re-establish its authority in the vulnerable areas, and the mindless bloodletting sanctioned by the ultras turned public opinion against them.
Taking full advantage of the political instability of the 80’s and 90’s, the Naxalities re-established themselves in their old areas and used these bases to spread their tentacles in other regions. Under the banner of CPI (Maoist) they succeeded in uniting the various sub groups. The emergence of Maoists as the dominant political force in Nepal gave further boost to their morale.
Amidst all this the government response remained disoriented and disjointed. Naxalism was routinely treated as a ‘law and order’ problem to be tackled by the affected states. This was a mistake, because the police forces were too ill equipped to tackle the situation.
By the end of the last century the Maoists had expanded their influence politically, socially, territorially and economically – and by 2005 they had made their presence felt in 11 states. They remain well entrenched in large parts of Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal and Bihar.
The reasons behind the birth and growth of Maoist armed movements are well known, but both Central and state governments looked on passively. A competent anti-Maoist counter would have been to speedily and effectively strengthen Panchayati Raj institutions. This would have empowered the people and isolated the Maoists.
Armed revolutions against the modern state, especially those which have popular sanction, generally fail. To succeed, the revolution would require support from an outside power: direct or proxy invasion by a strong power or a civil war or a coup d’etat. But none of the three appears to be feasible in India. The Maoists, no matter how committed, are no match for the might of the government forces. Indeed they would do well to keep the fate of the LTTE in mind and quickly reform.
But this is not to say that the Maoist movement has not been without some notable achievements. In its own way it has empowered the poorest sections of our population. It has brought women in the forefront of the struggle. It has given voice to the dumb, so that even the sparrow has been turned into a hawk. So now no one can afford to neglect these communities and the areas they live in.
Development by all accounts is the key to solving this problem. The governments have an ambitious blueprint to develop these areas and have set apart a big budget for the purpose. However, since top-ranking Maoist leaders like Ganapati and Kishenji have summarily rejected the offer of negotiations, the sole alternative is to supplement developmental initiatives with an effective and coordinated armed response. As for the Maoist leaders, they urgently need to rethink and amend their strategies. This ‘Red Corridor’ or the ‘Compact Revolutionary Zone – stretching from Tirupati to Pashupati – can’t just be wished away. Yet while there is widespread sympathy and support for their cause, there is none for their methodology.
For Complete IIPM Article, Click on IIPM Article
Source : IIPM Editorial, 2009
has been compounded further by heavy crop losses due to poor rainfall. And to add to their woes, the crop they toiled to grow has been devoured by swarming insects. A conjuction of these factors have hit cultivators so badly that many of them are struggling to pay their loans.
presidential convoy was passing through the main commercial district of Dallas, driving from the airport to the city centre. A bystander alleged that shots were fired from the casement of a construction across the road. The President buckled into Jackie Kennedy’s arms, who was heard crying out “Oh no”. The President’s limousine was immediately driven at speed to the Parklands Hospital. He died 35 minutes after being shot. Within hours of the shooting, a cop approached Lee Harvey Oswald, believing he matched the description of the killer. The cop was shot dead. Oswald was arrested straightaway, suspected of being the assassin. Shortly afterwards, he was charged. The suspect was never tried as he was shot dead two days later.
Kashmir’s under-22 CK Nayudu Trophy team could have long-term repercussions on cricket in the Valley. Parvez Rasool and Mehraj-ud-din were detained by the Bangalore police on October 17 on suspicion that they were carrying explosives in their kitbags. They were let off because the securitymen found nothing incriminating on the two boys.